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ROADS TO DEMOCRACY 
Lawrence M. Friedman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Democracy seems to be on the march in the modem world. This 
has been a remarkable trend in the last two generations or so. The 
victory of the Allies in the Second World War put an end to the Nazi 
empire in Europe, and crushed the Japanese Empire in the Pacific. 
Germany, Italy, and Japan were set on the path to democracy. In the 
post-war period, all of the traditional empires disintegrated-the British 
Empire, the French Empire, and others. Dozens of colonies became 
free. Some of them, too, became democracies, most notably India. In 
the 1970's, Franco died and democracy triumphed in Spain. Later, 
there was a trend away from military dictatorship in Latin America. 
South Korea and Taiwan then joined the club of democracies. The 
Soviet Union collapsed, near the end of the century. Democracy took 
hold in parts of this shattered empire too: in some former "satellites" 
(the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary), and in some of the national 
fragments spun off from the Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Large 
parts of the world, of course, remain securely under the control of 
autocrats. But the United States is (or claims to be) committed to 
spreading the joys of democratic government all over the world. It even 
uses this idea as the reason, or excuse, for the American presence in 
Iraq. 
Of course, "democracy" is not a simple concept; and no two 
systems that claim to be democracies are exactly the same. The "rule of 
law" is if anything an even more contested concept. For the purposes of 
this paper, we do not really need to define democracy rigorously. A 
society with a reasonable dose of freedom of speech and the press, 
freedom of religion, more or less fair elections, and the customary 
package of basic human rights, respected (on the whole) by the 
government, qualifies as a democracy. These will also tend to be 
societies that respect the rule of law. "Rule of law" is another concept, 
which is hard to define; the phrase has many possible meanings. For 
our purposes, however, it simply means a system in which rights and 
duties can be enforced through an independent and reasonably impartial 
system of courts. A court system is "independent" when the 
government or regime has no power or inclination to affect the outcome 
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of cases. 
No country, of course, is perfect. No country can claim to be 
absolutely and completely "democratic." But quite a few come close 
enough to the ideal type to satisfy its citizens. On the other hand, the 
"rule of law," as defined here, is much less achievable. Perhaps it is an 
impossible goal. Or perhaps not a goal at all, but simply an example of 
sociological naivete. That is, judges cannot simply decide "according to 
the law"; cannot be neutral and impartial as most lay people imagine 
they ought to be. Norms, values, attitudes, and the politics of the 
situation are always a factor in the behavior of judges. Nonetheless, 
there is a critical difference between totalitarian societies, in which a 
defiant decision can cost a judge his head, or in which higher authorities 
dictate the results (at least in politically charged cases); 1 and democratic 
societies, where judges have long tenure or life tenure and are free to 
disregard what the people in power might want them to decide. 
If we look around the world, we see some gray areas--countries 
which are on the brink of democracy but not quite there; or countries 
that have been there and lapsed; or countries whose membership in the 
club of democracies is somewhat doubtful. Still, I think there would be 
general agreement about the core membership of the club. It would 
include most of the rich, developed countries: the United States, 
Canada, all of Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, 
Chile, and Costa Rica in Latin America, along with quite a few other 
countries. If we were willing to relax our definition, even slightly, we 
could include a great many more. 
Each country has its own distinctive history, of course, and each 
one has traveled a unique path to its form of democratic rule. But there 
may be some general paths or patterns on the road to democracy; other 
paths or patterns might be unique but also uniquely interesting. I want 
to mention three examples or patterns, without suggesting that they are 
the only roads that countries have followed in the search for democracy. 
The United States is one example; Great Britain represents a different 
path; and Japan a third. Presumably, these different paths have had 
consequences, politically and otherwise. Still, after I describe the three 
paths, I intend, in a sense, to take it all back by arguing that the 
historical paths no longer matter very much in the world we live in 
today. This is not to deny that they were of great significance in the 
1. See Inga Markovits, Children of a Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist 
Germany, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2270, 2288-89 (1996). In the German Democratic Republic 
there was "telephone justice," that is, in a sensitive case, party officials would call a judge 
and let her know how the case was supposed to come out. 
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past; or even to deny that to some extent the past lives on, and 
influences particular forms of democracy, in big and little ways. But in 
our times, as I have already mentioned, one sees a kind of democratic 
epidemic, an infectious outbreak of democratic forms, which has swept 
over large parts of the world. This means, I believe, that there are 
powerful forces of leveling and convergence at work among most 
countries, and certainly among all developed countries. The developed 
countries are becoming a single, universal, world-wide club of nations, 
subject to common and significant clusters of social and economic 
forces. It would be foolish to argue that all the differences between the 
United States, Great Britain, and Japan, for example, have disappeared 
into the dustbin of history. But there are also enormous commonalities 
among modem democracies. The similarities, it seems to me, are in 
many ways more striking than the differences. 
I. THREE ROADS 
I mention England as an example of one road to democracy. 
Progress in England proceeded, more or less, in a top-down way. 
England was, like most European nations, a monarchy. The king stood 
at the apex of society. In the middle ages, the crown dominated politics 
and society in general; the crown shared its power with a hereditary 
class of nobles, and high officials of the church. In early modem times, 
these ancient power-centers had to move over to make room for rich 
merchants and a rising business class. Traditionally, the common man 
hardly mattered, politically. The great monuments along the road to 
democracy, starting with Magna Carta, were hardly the result of grass-
roots agitation. It was the barons who extorted Magna Carta from the 
king. The nobility and the elites gradually whittled down the power of 
the crown. Elizabeth I, in the sixteenth century, was still very much the 
queen; she had to reckon with Parliament, but she possessed awesome 
authority. By the end of the eighteenth century, the monarch had lost 
much of this authority. Queen Victoria was largely a figurehead. 
Parliament governed in her name; and it was Parliament that held 
power; it was Parliament, along with the Prime Minister, the cabinet, 
and the growing civil service, that made the crucial decisions, wrote the 
laws and the regulations, and put them into effect. 
Parliament, however, was hardly a monument to democracy in the 
nineteenth century. One chamber of the legislature was the House of 
Lords; its members were the country's earls, dukes and barons. The 
House of Commons was not really a house for commoners; its wealthy, 
upper-class members were connected by blood and marriage to the 
nobility or at least to the landed gentry. If an Earl sat in the House of 
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Lords, his younger brother (technically a commoner) may well have 
been a member of the House of Commons. In England, the suffrage 
was extremely narrow, well into the nineteenth century. Change came 
about quite slowly. Leaders and reformers who pressed for change 
were almost always themselves from the upper class. Even the 
formation of a socialist party, the Labor Party, in the late nineteenth 
century, did not change the demography of reform. Most leaders of the 
Labor Party came from the ranks of the elite-they went to the same 
schools and universities as other members of the elite, spoke with the 
same accent, and shared in the same general culture. Democracy 
percolated downward from this group. A prime minister from a log 
cabin, an Abraham Lincoln, would have been quite unthinkable in 
England. Perhaps it is still unthinkable. This pattern-democracy as a 
slow evolution, which percolates down from the ranks of the elites-
may well be found in other European countries as well. 
I think this pattern may have real consequences. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the aristocratic, top-down nature of the English path may 
help account for the fact that the British welfare state flourished earlier, 
and more completely, than the American welfare state. Top-down 
reform seems, moreover, to be something of a paradox. Why should an 
aristocracy commit suicide? What led elites to manage, direct, and 
produce a democratic system? Was it because of the ideas of the 
enlightenment? Were these men intoxicated with the thought of John 
Locke or Rousseau-or Karl Marx? Or was it-as seems more likely-
because of powerful, slow-moving social changes, which produced both 
democracy and the ideas of John Locke, Rousseau, and Karl Marx? 
Perhaps it was the impact of the industrial revolution, the rise of modem 
capitalism, and similar grand historical events, all of which fed the 
chain of events. This is, of course, far too complex a subject to be 
handled in these few pages. My point is that, in the short run, the 
precise pattern of development no doubt made a difference in the kind 
and quality of British democracy. A society governed by an elite-even 
a left-wing elite-was a society which, in a way, could afford to 
concede a great deal to the mass of the people. The social positions of 
the upper classes were not threatened by a welfare state. Habits of 
deference to authority persisted, and guaranteed that the upper class 
would continue to rule. This, however, was (as it turned out) only a 
short-run consequence. The long run is another story. 
This brings me to the second pattern, which is democracy that 
comes from the outside in. In a word, imposed democracy. This is the 
democracy of Germany, Italy, and Japan. All of them were 
dictatorships in the 1930s, and expansive dictatorships at that. All of 
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them were roundly defeated in the Second World War. The United 
States, England, and France occupied what became West Germany, and 
imposed democratic forms on this part of the country. The German 
Basic Law was adopted in 1948-49, when West Germany was still 
under the control of the allies. There was no plebiscite in West 
Germany. Democracy was not an option; the occupying powers simply 
insisted on it. In Japan, perhaps the most extreme case, the American 
authorities drafted a constitution and essentially rammed it down the 
throats of the Japanese.2 There is a certain irony here: the American 
occupation, headed by General MacArthur, had virtually dictatorial 
powers-which it used to create democratic forms. 
There were, at the time, many people in the West who were 
skeptical as to whether these experiments in democracy would work. 
They doubted that democracy really had a future in these countries. 
Germany and Japan (they said) had no tradition of freedom and self-
rule; did not understand it culturally, and would not easily accept it. 
These countries were used to a system of blind obedience to a leader or 
an Emperor. Yet time has proved these pessimists wrong. The imposed 
democracies have been, in fact, enormously successful. Perhaps the job 
took a generation or two.3 But both Germany and Japan, today, are 
mature democracies. They have free elections, freedom of speech, the 
press, and religion; their legal systems are efficient and respected, and 
the vast majority of their citizens vote for mainstream parties. It seems 
inconceivable that Germany, Italy, or Japan would ever revert to 
authoritarian government. But why, exactly, is this so? This is a 
question which we will try to answer later in this essay. 
The American road to democracy followed a path which seems 
quite different from the two just described. It can be roughly labeled as 
a bottom-up development. The seeds of democracy were planted quite 
early, as early as the seventeenth century, when the first settlers 
established colonies on the Eastern Seaboard. They had no intention, to 
be sure, of setting up democratic government. Their tastes were, if 
anything, theocratic, especially in the Puritan colonies. The magistrates 
and clergy who ran the colonies controlled many aspects of life with a 
tight hand. But events overtook the settlements, and, in the process, 
2. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 346-
404 (1999). 
3. G.R. Boynton & Gerhard Loewenberg, The Development of Public Support for 
Parliament in Germany, 1951-59, 3 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 169, 170 (Apr. 1973). The authors 
state that, "Between 1951and1961, the proportion of the population favoring a single-party 
system to competitive parties was halved." There was" ... a growth in public understanding 
of the new democratic regime and a rise in positive evaluations of it." 
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undermined authoritarian government. 
The most important factor, perhaps, was the sheer abundance of 
land. From the standpoint of the white settlers, the supply of land-
good land, fertile land-was endless; and it was almost free for the 
taking. To be sure, there were native tribes on much of the land; but the 
colonists paid, on the whole, little attention to their claims. They never 
conceded that the natives actually "owned" the land. Out of the brute 
fact of abundance of land, there developed a society markedly different 
from the societies of the Old World. America became a society in 
which average families and average households had a capital asset: a 
farm, a house, a shop.4 There were no landed gentry. The widespread 
ownership of land was already evident in the colonial period. There 
were, to be sure, many members of a landless class-indentured 
servants, for example. An indentured servant was a kind of temporary 
slave: he or she usually lived in the master's house, received no wages, 
and could not quit work before the end of the term (often seven years). 
Moreover, the master could sell the servant, and the years remaining on 
his indenture, to another master. 5 In the plantation south, the conditions 
of life (and land tenure) were somewhat more akin to the English 
situation than conditions in the northern and middle colonies. On the 
large plantations, African slaves made up the bulk of the work force. 6 
Their condition was permanent; and their children were also slaves. 
Indentured servitude died out after the Revolutionary War. 7 
Slavery was abolished in the north; and never existed in the new states 
of the middle west. 8 In the north and the middle west, and to a lesser 
degree, the south, average households owned a piece of land. As late as 
1850, it was still true in England that a small group of landed gentry 
owned virtually all the land, living lives of luxury on the rents paid by 
thousands of tenant farmers. The typical Illinois family, on the other 
hand, owned his eighty acres of land, either free and clear, or subject to 
4. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3rd ed. 
2005). 
5. See generally ABBOT EMERSON SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE 
AND CONVICT LABOR IN AMERICA, 1607-1776, 70-71 ( 194 7). 
6. Large estates on the Hudson, in upstate New York, were an exception to the norm of 
small, family farms in New England and the middle colonies. These estates, owned by 
"patroons," whose tenants paid them a yearly rent, were a source of considerable unrest, and 
were eventually eliminated. See CHARLES w. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK 
LAW AND POLITICS, 1839-1865 (2001). 
7. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 
IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 11-12 (1991). 
8. The Northwest Territory Ordinance (1787) prohibited slavery in the territory that 
later became Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
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a mortgage. In addition, American government was radically 
decentralized. The United States Constitution had set up a federal 
system. The national government had limited powers, and the national 
capital, Washington, D.C., was an insignificant village. Most of the 
political activity took place in the states and in towns and cities. Many 
states clung, for a while, to property qualifications-only landowners or 
taxpayers could vote, but most male heads of household were already 
property-owners. Property qualifications began to decay in the 
Revolutionary period, and were "gradually dismantled after 1790." By 
1850, the property qualification was essentially gone.9 Our Illinois 
farmer had the right to vote; and he counted for something in his small 
community. The city laborer also had the right to vote, and to make his 
voice heard. America was, then, already a grass-roots democracy. 
Of course, nowadays we look back at the nineteenth century with a 
much more jaundiced eye. We see the gross and glaring imperfections 
of American "democracy." Women did not vote; married women, until 
about the middle of the nineteenth century, were not much better off, 
legally speaking, than infants and idiots. They could not control 
property, or enter into contracts. All economic power was in the hands 
of their husbands. 10 Millions of African-Americans were slaves, 
without property, or rights, under the almost absolute control of their 
owners. 11 Free blacks, north and south, were treated everywhere as 
second-class citizens. Nowhere did they enjoy anything remotely like 
political or social equality. The treatment of the native peoples was 
shameful-and at times violent, and almost genocidal. Still, despite all 
of this, in the eyes of Americans themselves, America was a real 
democracy, a shining example of freedom and popular government. 
And most outside observers tended to agree. They obviously were not 
comparing America with what it would later become; they were 
comparing it to existing societies, especially European societies. To 
Europeans, America was a bold new experiment in government of the 
people, for the people, by the people. It was this aspect of American 
society that so fascinated observers like Alexis de Tocqueville. 
America, he thought, was pioneering a "great democratic revolution."12 
9. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2000); see also id. tables A.2 & A.3. 
10. The change came with the adoption of the Married Women's Property Acts; see 
LA WREN CE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 14 7 (3d ed. 2005). 
11. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 
(1996). 
12. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. 
Mayer ed., Doubleday 1969). 
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And in many ways, America, because of this history, and because 
of its land tenure system, its decentralization, and its egalitarian 
philosophy was, in fact, a pioneer in many aspects of what we would 
now consider democratic government. But, paradoxically, some of 
these same features would later act as impediments-if not to 
democracy, then to the modem welfare-regulatory state. Federalism, 
for example, was no friend to social welfare legislation. There was also 
no reform-minded, liberal civil service. This most democratic of 
countries has been, in many ways, a laggard in developing a state which 
provides for the poor, the sick, and the downtrodden. There is much 
more inequality, much more of a gap between rich and poor, than in 
many of the European democracies. 
These, then, are three distinct patterns of development. Each has 
had its consequences, politically and socially. The three patterns almost 
certainly do not exhaust the historical possibilities. Surely there are 
features in the history of English-speaking colonies like Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada that make these countries different both from the 
United States and from Great Britain. Perhaps colonies that became 
free when the old empires collapsed after the Second World War 
deserve to be put in their own category: India, for example, and the 
small countries of the Caribbean (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad). There 
also seem to be countries that became democratic more or less by 
diffusion; they modeled themselves after countries with long histories of 
democratic government. There may be countries that democratize under 
the influence of a powerful, nearby nation. Surely an interesting story 
can be told about such countries as Spain, and South Korea; Taiwan, 
perhaps; Greece and Portugal. The European Union, as it expands, 
insists on a commitment to democracy, from any country that wants to 
join the club. Its rules and requirements have had an influence on the 
countries of Eastern Europe that were knocking on the door. Still, in 
my view, all recent converts to democracy show the influence of 
cultural diffusion. Or, to put it another way, they show the results of a 
growing, world-wide culture of modernity-a culture which fosters 
democracy and the rule of law. 
II. FORWARDMARCH 
Each of the democratic countries, as I said, has had its own unique 
history; has traveled its own unique path. But if you put all of these 
paths together, I think some patterns emerge which are quite striking. 
The role of modernization, of modernity itself, seems to be decisive. It 
seems fair to say that five hundred years ago, no society on earth would 
qualify as "democratic," under present standards. Perhaps none of them 
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even came close. Societies were ruled by kings and emperors, by 
oligarchs and tribal chiefs. Even as late as 1900, the club of 
democracies was exceedingly small. Even within this club, there were 
aspects, which were (by our lights) profoundly undemocratic-the place 
of women in society, for example. In 1900, in democratic America, or 
democratic Switzerland, women did not have the right to vote. 
Since 1900, a great deal has changed. The march toward 
democratic rule in the twentieth century, of course, was dramatic, but it 
was hardly a smooth, linear development. 13 The century included some 
of the worst, bloodiest, and most tyrannical dictatorships in human 
history, along with some of the worst examples of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing. This was the century of Hitler, Stalin, Mao Tse Tung and Pol 
Pot; the century of the rape ofNanking, the Holocaust, and the slaughter 
of innocents in Rwanda. Yet the difference between the status of world 
politics in 2000, and what world politics was like in 1900, is stark and 
dramatic. In 1900, the great European empires were at their height, or 
were perhaps still growing. Indeed, what we now consider the third 
world was a collection of colonies, ruled for the most part from some 
distant capital: London, Paris, or Lisbon. Buttressed by racist 
ideologies, the European powers saw no particular reason to grant the 
right of self-government to "primitive" people, savages, heathens. Even 
the United States had felt the imperial urge, and swallowed up remnants 
of the decaying Spanish empire. 
Imperialism in its classic sense remained a strong force until about 
the middle of the twentieth century. Mussolini's Italy felt cheated out 
of an empire. As far as he was concerned, this was excuse enough for 
him to conquer Albania, Libya, and Ethiopia. The Japanese were busy 
putting together their own empire in Asia. Both Taiwan and Korea 
were Japanese colonies. Hitler's Germany swept over Europe, reducing 
smaller countries to vassals, over which Germany ruled with an iron 
fist. 
Japan and Germany lost the Second World War. This cost the 
Japanese their empire. The Germans were forced to disgorge all of the 
territory they had conquered in Europe, and their own country was in 
part dismembered. Yet the winners of the war soon found themselves 
no better off, as far as their empires were concerned. The British and 
the French had to give up their colonies in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. 
13. For example, Germany went from autocratic rule under the Kaiser to a more or less 
feeble democratic regime under the Weimar Republic. This was followed by Hitler and, 
after his downfall, democracy. Other countries that went from democracy to dictatorship to 
democracy again include Chile and Argentina. 
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The Dutch lost their grip on Indonesia. The Portuguese had to let go of 
Angola and Mozambique. All of the former colonies, with a few minor 
exceptions, became free and sovereign nations. Some of them also 
became successful democracies (many, alas, did not). The Soviet Union 
was the only country that gained territorially, and much of Eastern 
Europe fell under its influence. Yet, toward the end of the twentieth 
century, the Soviet Empire itself disintegrated. The fifteen republics 
that had made up the Soviet Union became independent, sovereign 
nations. Some of these, too, became democracies-very notably, the 
small Baltic States (others, especially in central Asia, did not). Russia 
lost its grip over Eastern Europe, which had been in a quasi-colonial 
situation, and democracy has blossomed in some of this area as well-
in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The German Democratic 
Republic dissolved, and was absorbed into democratic West Germany. 
Over the last two generations, then, the march toward democratic 
rule has been steady, powerful, and seemingly irresistible, in many (but 
not all) parts of the world. In Western Europe, democracy became 
virtually universal. The remaining authoritarian governments, in Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece collapsed, and solid democracies replaced them. 
The story in Asia and Latin America is more complicated. In South 
America, countries like Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have 
shuttled in and out of the camp of the democracies. At present they 
seem fairly firmly ensconced there. Africa is a more tragic story, but a 
vibrant democracy exists in the Republic of South Africa; and there are 
signs of progress in a number of other African countries. Democracy is 
spreading in Asia as well. Taiwan and Korea have become true 
democracies and seem likely to remain that way. There are also quite a 
few countries with imperfect democracies, but which seem to be 
heading in a more democratic direction though slowly and unevenly. 
Even some countries which, in all honesty, we would have to label as 
half-democracies are engaged in struggles to make their governments 
more accountable, to strengthen the rule of law, and to strive toward 
stronger constitutional government. Mexico is a good example. 14 
14. See Rogelio Perez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin Legal Culture in the Age 
of Globalization, ch. 1 in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA 
AND LATIN EUROPE 1 (Lawrence Friedman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo eds. 2003) 
[hereinafter LEGAL CULTURE]; see also Maria Ines Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of 
Democratic Institutionalization, ch. 2 in LEGAL CULTURE, supra, at 20; Edmundo 
Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974-1999, ch. 4 in LEGAL 
CULTURE, supra, at 108; and Sergio L6pez-Ayll6n & Hector Fix-Fierro, "Faraway, So 
Close!" The Rule of Law and Legal Change in Mexico, 1970-2000, ch. 9 in LEGAL 
CULTURE, supra, at 285. Each of these essays portray countries struggling toward 
constitutional democracy. 
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A large part of the world still lives under conditions of autocracy. 
This includes China, the largest country of them all; it also includes 
Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos. It includes as well most of the countries in 
Africa. Some of these countries have gone backwards, and have 
suffered under truly awful dictators and satraps. The autocratic world 
includes almost all of the Middle East, from Morocco to the Arabian 
Peninsula, and beyond (for example, Pakistan). Iran holds periodic 
elections, but nobody could claim this country as a democracy. The fate 
of Iraq is very much an open question. Nonetheless, change in the 
twentieth century has been quite remarkable, and on the whole, has led 
in a single direction, though with many ups and downs. The world in 
the early twentieth-first century, as we said, is a very different place 
from the world a century before. 
III. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
How can we explain this development? Obviously, there is no 
single factor that we can isolate and say: this is the cause. The 
expansion of the club of democratic societies is obviously the result of 
very complex processes. But a few basic facts seem clear. The 
fundamental fact is a process of cultural diffusion. And it is modernity 
itself that is diffused from society to society. "Modernity" of course 
means many things. It has its technological side, its political side, and 
its cultural side. Most basic of all, perhaps, is its psychological side: the 
growth of individualism. Whether individualism is the cause or the 
effect of modernity, or any of its aspects, is a difficult question-
perhaps a chicken-and-egg question. In any event, it is a question we do 
not have to answer here. All that we are claiming here is that 
democracy is a byproduct of modernity and individualism; democracy 
results when the public, or some important part of the public, puts 
political pressure on governments, in societies that have modernized, 
and where modal personalities have developed along individualistic 
lines. The argument is also that these forces and pressures are common 
to the whole developed world. The argument is, in short, that there is a 
single basic culture of modernity; 15 that this culture implies democracy; 
and that powerful technological forces spread this culture from one end 
of the globe to another. 
That this is now a single, conjoined world, in terms of 
communication, is completely obvious. It is easy to see how ideas of 
15. I have also argued that there is a single legal culture of modernity. Lawrence M. 
Friedman, ls There a Modern Legal Culture?, 7 RATIO JURIS 117 (1994). 
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democracy and the rule of law can be diffused from society to society 
technologically speaking. Nor are these ideas easy to resist. China, for 
example, tries to keep out alien ideas, to control the Internet, to censor 
the press; and so do many of the autocracies of the Middle East. But 
this job seems to be growing more difficult over time. We have to ask, 
however, why it is hard to stifle and censor. It was so simple in the past. 
Diffusion of democratic ideas needs an audience, needs a soil in which 
to grow. The diffusion, then, presupposes a pre-existing culture of 
human rights. It presupposes a world in which there are eyes willing to 
see, ears willing to hear, and brains willing to absorb. Globalization 
provides the fertile soil. This calls for a word of explanation. 
First, with respect to that slippery term, "globalization." The word 
is in constant use today; but often quite loosely. There are, to be sure, 
all sorts of definitions and explanations of globalization. The core 
notion is, in my view, often misunderstood. Many people think of 
globalization chiefly in economic terms-above all as a matter of 
international trade. They may also think about political and economic 
interconnections between nations; and about travel, tourism, emigration 
and immigration; about multi-national corporations, and the evaporation 
of borders and of sovereignty. All of these are important factors. But 
underlying all of them is something far more basic. Globalization, in 
essence, is a matter of culture. 16 Modernity, we have argued, implies 
the development of a single world-wide culture. Globalization, too, is a 
result of modernity; it is a form, or adaptation, of that culture. The 
diffusion of ideas about democracy and the rule of law is only one 
example-an important example-of the diffusion of a global culture. 
The heart of the matter is the spread of habits, behavior patterns, desires 
and expectations, from country to country. This is more basic than the 
increase or spread of international trade, or the physical movement of 
peoples; and is, indeed, an important source of these vital modem 
processes. 
But let me comment briefly about international trade. There has, 
of course, always been trade between nations and communities; there 
has always been an exchange of goods between different societies. In 
the past, though, world trade was, on the whole, asymmetrical. Some 
countries provided raw materials, which they shipped to other countries. 
Some countries manufactured finished products, which they traded with 
countries that had no capacity to produce those goods. Often, it was the 
case that rich countries bought raw materials, processed them, made 
16. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. 
J. INT'L L. 347 (2001). 
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sophisticated goods, and then consumed those goods in the home 
country. To be sure, trade is still, and will always be, asymmetrical in 
certain regards. For example, Saudi Arabia has oil; Japan does not. 
Bananas, pineapples, and cocoa do not come from Poland. Gold, silver, 
and copper can be mined in some countries, and not in others. But most 
products can be, and are, produced anywhere; and then sold 
everywhere. People buy T-shirts from China, automobiles from Japan, 
cell-phones from Finland, and running shoes from Indonesia. Not one 
of these products depends on the location of mines or wells or raw 
materials, in general. 17 
What is even more striking is the globalization of demand. The 
Chinese do not simply make T-shirts; they also wear them. The 
Japanese make cars, and sell them all over the world (more and more, 
Japanese companies also make them all over the world); they also drive 
cars, as any observer of the clogged streets of Tokyo can attest. Modern 
technology-the automobiles, jet planes, and computers-are just as 
much at home in Seoul or Beijing as they are in New York or in Paris. 
People's shopping lists are amazingly similar all over the world. If they 
have money, they want the same goods. They want blue jeans; they 
want cell-phones, cars, color television sets, and CDs of rock-and-roll 
music. This similarity of desire is the very essence of globalization. 
And the similarity of wants and ambitions stems from an underlying 
similarity of mind-set; in short, a similarity of culture. 
This phenomenon-cultural convergence-is visible, wherever 
one looks in the world, and most particularly in the developed countries 
of the world. This is egregiously so even if we take Japan as an 
example. Japan is an exceedingly rich country-the richest non-
W estern country (except perhaps for a few oil sheikdoms); it has a 
powerful, vibrant economy, and a standard of living which is the envy 
of most other countries. Japan is in the forefront of technology. 
Japanese electronics and Japanese cars are trend-setters all over the 
world. In Japan, one finds skyscrapers, high-speed trains, computers, 
cell phones, and all the other trappings of a modern, technological 
society. Yet among scholars, one sometimes finds the view that Japan 
is nonetheless essentially different from European or North American 
countries. The Japanese (they say) have modernized, on the outside; but 
17. And, more and more, the same could be said about financial and other services. 
People in Japan can bank in Switzerland or the Cayman Islands. Nobody has figured out as 
yet how to globalize haircuts and carwashes; but American medical records can be read and 
analyzed in India, and American airline companies can shift their reservation offices 
overseas if they wish. 
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inside, they have never changed. Inside, they retain some sort of 
mystical essence, some core of Japanese-ness, which stubbornly 
persists, some national traits that survive in the face of the wild, 
swirling forces of the contemporary world.18 
Differences between Japan and, say, France or the United States 
are certainly obvious even to the casual visitor. Yet if we compare 
Japan today with other developed countries, the similarities (I think) are 
much more striking than the differences. The tall buildings look like 
everybody else's tall buildings. The airports are like every other airport. 
People dress much the same as they do elsewhere in the developed 
world; people drag out their kimonos and robes, if at all, only for 
ceremonial occasions. Chairs and tables are replacing tatami mats. The 
Tokyo Symphony plays Mozart and Beethoven; the Tokyo teenager 
listens to rock and roll music, and sends text-messages to friends on the 
ubiquitous cell-phone. Western food is everywhere in the big cities-
everything from fancy French restaurants, to MacDonald's and 
Kentucky Fried Chicken. Of course, the Japanese still eat great 
quantities of traditional Japanese food-sushi, for example. But 
Japanese cuisine has itself become globalized. Sushi is no longer 
something that only the Japanese like to eat. There is a sushi craze in 
Philadelphia, Caracas, or London. Sushi has jumped over borders, and 
now encircles the globe. It follows the path of many other foods-
curry, bagels, pizza, or egg rolls-that were once associated with a 
single, national cuisine, and are now available almost everywhere. 
Global culture is common to the whole W estem world, to the 
whole developed world. It is also the culture of the middle class in 
third-world countries. And this global culture is not just food, 
buildings, technology, and consumer products. It is also a set of 
attitudes. These attitudes are the ones which lay the basis for the 
movement toward democracy. It is hard for me to accept the idea that 
the Japanese are really so different from the rest of the developed world, 
when they share so much of the technology, so many of the habits and 
attributes, of these other countries. 
It is not easy to explain exactly what social forces brought about 
the cultural revolution which I have been describing. Obviously, there 
was no single cause. A whole cluster of factors and forces produced the 
modem world-the industrial, high-tech world we live in. These 
18. On the relationship between Japanese culture and its legal order, see generally John 
0 . Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978); see also 
FRANK K. UPHAM, LA w AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (Harvard University Press) 
(1987). 
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factors also produced modem culture. The mass media have played an 
especially important role in creating and spreading that culture. The 
mass media are among the most influential institutions of modem 
society. The story of their rise to prominence begins with the popular 
press; then, in the twentieth century, came radio, then the movies, then 
television and, more and more in this day and age, the Internet. There is 
an incredible wealth of words, images, ideas, and conversations on the 
World Wide Web. We are at the dawn of the Internet Age; but we can 
already see what a mighty force this medium is likely to become. On 
the Internet, one can find almost any message one wants, reach out to 
any group one wants, satisfy almost any taste one wishes to indulge, 
share messages with people in all parts of the world. 
Meanwhile, television has been a particularly potent force in 
creating our contemporary world. Every middle-class home in the 
W estem world has a television set; perhaps two or three. Indeed, in 
many countries, no home is so humble as to do without. Even in the 
third world, all except the most isolated villages have some access to 
television. Satellites make it possible, too, to beam news and images 
around the world in literally no time at all. By the end of the twentieth 
century, then, the modem media had greatly reduced the importance of 
time and distances-culturally speaking, they are almost meaningless. 
People all over the world watch funerals, coronations-and wars-in 
real time, as the events occur. But, more significantly, ideas and images 
circle the globe. The media has also gone a great way toward reducing 
cultural isolation. There are no longer any hermit kingdoms. No 
country is an island. Every country is connected to every other country. 
The offerings on television are incredibly diverse. There are 
educational programs, weather programs, shows about crime and police, 
soap operas, ballets, televangelists, "reality" shows, channels with old 
movies, channels with new movies, and so on almost ad infinitum. And 
yet it is not too much of a stretch to say that a common theme underlies 
almost all of television. Television and the other media spread the 
message of modem individualism. Not that they do so explicitly, or 
intentionally. But this is nonetheless the message. Television 
advertising is a clear case of this underlying message. In most 
countries, television is awash with advertising. In general, nothing is 
more characteristic of modem capitalism, and modem society, than 
advertising. Advertising is everywhere: not only on television, but also 
in newspapers and magazines, on billboards, in buses and cabs, 
sometimes even in writing in the sky. Advertising quite consistently 
tells a story of individualism; and, indeed, of a particular kind of 
individualism, the type that has been called expressive individualism. 
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This is the notion that a person's main task in life is to develop the self, 
the personality; to find and develop those attitudes and behaviors 
conducive to self-realization.19 
Advertising spreads this message. Advertising-whether on the 
air, in newspapers, or on the web-proclaims the same goals as 
expressive individualism. It hardly matters what product is advertised. 
The ads are directed at individuals, not families or groups; not tribes or 
clans. These messages tell people that they can be happier, richer, 
better, sexier; that they can have whiter teeth or cleaner clothes or cars 
that make other people drool. They send a message of self-
improvement, a message about satisfaction of desires. Hence 
advertising-and the mass media in general-subvert traditional values 
and upends traditional societies. It does this even if the surface message 
makes exactly the opposite claim. The media also homogenize; they 
"weaken and then destroy the local and the traditional"; since these 
depend on "isolation, on the strength of primary groups," the media 
"wreak havoc" among non-modem cultures; they flatten out speech-
pattems, erode local dialects, and promote assimilation into the majority 
culture.20 
And television, as we said, is ubiquitous. Children are exposed to 
the magic box almost from the day of birth. Television-and, more and 
more, the computer and the Internet-rival the parents as teachers, 
models, and agents of socialization. The parental monopoly has been, 
in fact, broken. The child learns how to become an individual, a person, 
and not just a member of the family; and it learns this from the media. 
The family, indeed, becomes a kind of cocoon, from which the child 
must escape to become a mature adult. The family of origin turns into a 
stage of life, rather than a permanent and fixed institution, a life-long 
haven and protection. This process-the decay or dissolution of the 
traditional family-goes on in all developed countries, though at 
different rates and paces. Divorce and family break-ups have become 
more common almost everywhere. But there are other examples of the 
process of individuation. For example, in the United States, England, or 
Sweden, children almost always leave home when they grow up. An 
adult child, unmarried and living at home, is considered slightly odd. In 
Italy or Spain, it is still quite normal for grown children to live at home; 
19. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM 
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE ( 1985). 
20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND 
CULTURE 204 (1990). 
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but the practice ofleavingthe nest is probably growing.21 
It is possible that the modem culture of personality and 
consumption blossomed first in the United States. This was, after all, 
the "first country ... to have an economy devoted to mass production," 
the first "to create the mass consumer institutions and the mass 
consumer enticements that rose up . . . to market and sell the mass-
produced goods."22 This would be no surprise, since the conditions that 
produced democracy also appeared early in the United States, as we 
have argued. But the other countries have probably caught up by now. 
Perhaps Spain or Japan have been slower to absorb this culture than, 
say, Sweden or the United States. But the movement in all modem 
countries seems to be going in the same direction. 
Individualism does more than undermine the power of the 
traditional family. It is an enemy of patriarchal authority in general. 
There seems little doubt that individualism sends a nation down the road 
to democracy. Or more accurately, it leads to a demand for democracy, 
for human rights, for a society and a climate in which the desires and 
the attitudes of the individual can be satisfied. Only a democracy is 
able, on the whole, to satisfy these demands-or at least to make the 
attempt. The spread of democracy-of the urge to become 
democratic-is one of the phenomena of recent history. Country after 
country has been influenced by this growing demand; country after 
country has gone through its democratic revolution, has opted for free 
elections, constitutions, and bills of rights; or have turned existing paper 
constitutions into reality. I have already mentioned the many examples: 
Germany and Japan; all of W estem Europe; Poland, and the Baltic 
countries, among others. Democracy has been surging ahead in Latin 
America. It is a growing force in Asia. It seems secure in India, which 
proudly calls itself the world's largest democracy, and in Korea and 
Taiwan; there has been ferment and change in other countries as well. 
There are, to be sure, gross exceptions to the trend, as we have 
mentioned. Obviously, there are plenty of societies which try to stifle 
the democratic urge, and to hold back the forces that lead to it. They 
have had more or less success. Democracy and the rule of law have by 
no means conquered the globe. As we mentioned, China, the largest 
21. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW 87 
(2004). In 1994, 79% of men in their 20's in Spain lived at home if they were unmarried; in 
the United Kingdom only 36% lived at home. See Constanza Tobio, Marriage, Cohabitation 
and the Residential Independence of Young People in Spain, 15 lnt'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 68 
(2001). 
22. WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW 
AMERICAN CULTURE 11-12 (1993). 
17
Friedman: Roads To Democracy
Published by SURFACE, 2005
68 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 33:51 
country in the world in terms of population, is also (so far) the largest 
exception to the rush toward democracy. Most of Africa, and most of 
the countries of the Islamic Middle East, seem to be stuck in a pre-
modern, pre-democratic phase. Democracy in Russia is shaky at best; 
and in the former Soviet Republics, with a few exceptions, democracy is 
still struggling to find itself. Still, to most of us in the West, in the 
heartland of democracy, most people seem sure that government of the 
people and by the people is the only long-term option for a sovereign 
nation. We tend to assume that this is the end point toward which all 
governments should evolve, must evolve, and are in the process of 
evolving.23 
But is this really so? Nothing is more risky than trying to predict 
the future. Democracy has its enemies; and they are strong and 
implacable. It is not simply a matter of dictators trying to hold on to 
their power. There is also genuine grass-roots opposition. Religious 
fundamentalism seems to be on the march, most notably in Moslem 
countries, but elsewhere as well. 24 Some, not all, versions of 
fundamentalism find it hard to coexist with democracy and the rule of 
law. Religious fundamentalists in the United States by and large have 
no particular quarrel with democracy (although they do, in some ways, 
challenge the separation of church and state). In other countries, 
fundamentalists are less bashful in their battle with all aspects of 
modernity, including democratic rule. And they do battle, not in the 
way of the Amish, that is, by withdrawing from the modern world, and 
forming a small, closed society; rather, they boldly confront the modern 
world, and hope to destroy at least some aspects of that world. 
Most Americans think that this is a war the other side cannot win. 
They think that autocracy is doomed. The regimes in Iran, or in China, 
simply cannot last. They count on modernity, the lure of the Internet, 
blue jeans, and movies, to overwhelm all the backward, anti-democratic 
forces. Certainly, this is a possible scenario for the future, perhaps even 
a likely one. Yet history is full of twists and turns. Nobody predicted 
the collapse of the Soviet empire. Nobody, really, predicted the rise and 
virulence of fundamentalist Islam; or, for that matter, of other world 
religions. Nobody predicted the strength of the Christian right-wing in 
23. We also assume that democracy is good for all countries, and that it will bring 
peace and prosperity. But see AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003) arguing that in an 
important group of countries-those in which an ethnic minority is economically 
dominant-"free market democracy" can lead to violence and severe internal conflict. 
24. For a (somewhat dated) overview, see FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED (R. Scott 
Appleby & Martin E. Marty eds., 1991 ). 
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American politics. Nobody foresaw the "war on terror." When the 
Soviet Union disintegrated, many people thought that China-or 
Cuba-would not be able to go on as in the past; that they would have 
to undergo radical change. So far, no such thing has happened. 
Moreover, there are dangers, shadows on the horizon, even within 
the West. Democracy implies limits on the power of government. 
These limits, historically, have been both structural and cultural. The 
structural limitations include written constitutions, bills of rights, an 
independent judiciary, and the whole system of checks and balances. 
More subtly (but probably more crucially) in the developed countries, 
there is a cultural commitment to democracy and limited government; a 
commitment to respect human rights and human dignity (at least up to a 
point). But perhaps limited government, and checks and balances, 
depended on important technological limitations-limitations which 
were largely taken for granted. The modem media-expensive and 
powerful-open the way for regimes and conglomerates to manipulate 
public knowledge and belief in frightening and threatening ways. At 
least some people might see dangers to democracy in new structures of 
control over the media. The free-wheeling, Wild West world of the 
Internet is also, perhaps, under threat.25 
Or consider, for example, the sanctity of the home. Laws (about 
warrants, searches and seizures, and so on) expressed a policy that 
seemed to guarantee privacy and safety. A person's home was his 
castle, and the state could not invade it, except when absolutely 
necessary, and when authorized by law. But the rules were devised for 
an age long before technology made it possible for the police to walk 
through the walls, so to speak. No legal rules about warrants and the 
like are truly effective, if there are devices that can listen to whispers a 
mile away, or unseen eyes that can watch and explore and invade.26 
The technology of Big Brother is not science-fiction; it is a plain and 
arrived fact. It remains to be seen if and how this technology will be 
used. Will there be sound, effective, workable controls? If not, it is 
hard to see how democracy can survive in the form we have grown to 
know and love, and in which we flourish. 
25. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001). 
26. "New X-ray devices can see through people's clothing, amounting to what some 
call a 'virtual strip-search.' Thermal sensors can detect movement and activity via heat 
patterns. . . . [P]arabolic microphones can record conversations at long distances .... 
Tracking devises can relay information about a person's whereabouts .... Surveillance 
cameras have become ubiquitous." Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance 
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1265 (2004). 
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